The Harrod-Domar growth model supposedly died long ago. But for over 40 years, economists working on developing countries have applied (and still today apply) the HarrodDomar model to calculate short-run investment requirements for a target growth rate. They then calculate a "Financing Gap" between the required investment and available resources, and often fill the "Financing Gap" with foreign aid. This paper traces the intellectual history of how a longdead model came to influence today's aid allocation to developing countries. The paper then asks if the model's surprising afterlife has been due to its consistency with the 40 years of data that have accumulated during its use. The answer is "no."
In April 1946, Evsey Domar published an article on economic growth called "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth, and Employment." This article did not discuss long run economic growth; it discussed the relationship between short-term recessions and investment in the United States. Domar assumed that production capacity was proportional to the capital stock. He admitted the assumption was unrealistic.
Eleven years later, complaining of an "ever-guilty conscience," he disavowed the original model altogether.
1 He said his purpose was to comment upon an esoteric debate on business cycles, not to derive "an empirically meaningful rate of growth." He said his model made no sense for long run growth. Domar endorsed the new growth model of Robert Solow, which would dominate economists' theoretical approach to growth for the next three decades.
To sum up, Domar's model was not intended as a growth model, made no sense as a growth model, and was repudiated as a growth model forty years ago by its creator. So it was ironic that Domar's growth model became, and continues to be today, the most widely applied growth model in economic history.
In this paper, I tell the story of how Domar's model (usually called the Harrod-Domar model) survived its supposed demise in the 1950s. Economists applied it (and still do apply it) to poor countries from Albania to Zimbabwe to determine a "required" investment rate for a target growth rate. The difference between the required investment and their own savings is the Financing Gap. Donors fill the Financing Gap with foreign aid to attain target growth. This is not a story about the long-run relationship between investment and growth --it's a story about a model that promised poor countries growth in the short-run through aid and investment.
I tell the story of the Ghost of Financing Gap in part I. In part II, I test empirically how well the predictions of the Harrod-Domar growth model match the data. Part III concludes with ideas for future practice.
I. The Harrod Domar Model, 1946-1997
Domar's approach to growth became popular because it had a wonderfully simple prediction: GDP growth will be proportional to the share of investment spending in GDP.
Domar assumed that output (Y) is proportional to machines (K) available at the beginning of the year, i.e. Y(t) = φ K(t-1). Then Y(t)-Y(t-1) = φ [K(t-1)-K(t-2)]. The right-hand side is just last year's net investment I(t-1). Divide both sides by last year's output. So GDP growth this year is just proportional to last year's investment/GDP ratio:
(Y(t)-Y(t-1))/Y(t-1) = φ I(t-1)/Y(t-1)
How did Domar get the idea that production was proportional to machines? Did not labor play some role in production? Domar was writing in the aftermath of the Great Depression that made many people running the machines lose jobs. Domar and many other economists expected a repeat of the Depression after World War II unless the government did something to avoid it.
Domar took high unemployment as a given, so there were always people available to run any additional machines that you built. The problem of balancing aggregate demand and supply was Domar's concern. Investment in building new machines had a dual character --it added to desired purchases of goods (demand) and it also added capacity (supply). These two effects would not necessarily be equal, Domar argued, and so the economy would spiral off into either chronic overproduction or chronic underproduction. This was the Harrod-Domar model. (Roy Harrod had published in 1939 a similar but more convoluted article, about which the less said the better.)
You can see that Domar's interest was the short run business cycle. So how did Domar's fixed ratio of production to machines make it into the analysis of poor countries' growth?
The Invention of Development
For centuries, nobody had paid much attention to the economic problems of poor countries. agreed that the poor countries should "develop." Economists rushed to give policy advice to the newly independent governments of the poor countries.
The first Development Economists were influenced by two simultaneous historical events: (1) like Domar, the Great Depression, and (2) the industrialization of the USSR through forced saving and investment. The Depression and the large number of underemployed rural people in poor countries motivated Sir Arthur Lewis to suggest a "surplus labor" model in which only capital was a constraint. Lewis suggested that building factories would soak up this labor without causing a decline in rural production.
How many new machines? Lewis and other 1950s development economists assumed a fixed ratio in production between people and machines, i.e. a Leontief production function. Since you had surplus labor, machines --not labor --were the binding constraint on production.
Production was proportional to machines, just as in Domar. Lewis suggested that the supply of available workers was "unlimited." He cited a particular example of an economy that had grown through pulling in excess labor from the countryside --the Soviet Union.
Economists usually discussed the growth to investment ratio the other way around --the ratio of "required" investment to desired growth. They called this ratio the Incremental Capital Output Ratio (ICOR), and thought it was somewhere between 2 and 5. 5 Lewis said "the central fact of economic development is rapid capital accumulation." 6 A country that wanted to develop had to go from an investment rate of 4 percent of GDP to 12-15 percent of GDP. Investment had to keep ahead of population growth. Development was a race between machines and motherhood.
To give a numerical example --a country with an investment rate of four percent of GDP and an ICOR of 4 will have growth of one percent per year. This does not even keep up with population growth of, say, two percent a year. If the country gets investment up to the Lewis magic number of twelve percent of GDP, then it will have GDP growth of three percent a year. Now the country is developing, with GDP per capita rising at one percent per year.
How do you get investment high enough? Say current national saving is 4 percent of GDP. The early development economists thought that poor countries were so poor they had little hope of increasing their saving. You have a "Financing Gap" of 8 percent of GDP between the required investment (12 percent of GDP for 3 percent GDP growth) and the current 4 percent of GDP level of national savings. So Western donors should fill the "Financing Gap" with foreign aid, which will make the required investment happen, which in turn will make the target output growth happen.
The early development economists were hazy about how long it took for aid to increase investment and in turn increase growth. In actual use of the model, as we will see below, the horizons were short-run: this year's aid will go into this year's investment, which will go into next year's GDP growth. Rostow shared a common view. Hard as it is to imagine today, many American opinion-makers thought that the Soviet system was superior for sheer output production, even if inferior in individual freedoms. In 1950s' issues of Foreign Affairs, writers noted the Soviet willingness to "extract large forced savings", the advantage of which "it is difficult to overemphasize". In "economic power", they will "grow faster than we do." Pundits warned that the competitor derived "certain advantages" from the "centralized character of the operation". There was danger that the Third World, attracted by "certain advantages", would go Communist. The US decreased its foreign aid after that peak under Johnson, but other rich countries more than compensated. Figure 2 shows the whole long upward trend of total foreign aid (grants and soft loans) by the Western industrial countries. 13 Over the entire period 1950-95, the Western countries gave one trillion dollars (measured in 1985 dollars) in aid. Since virtually all of the aid advocates used the Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap model, this was one of the largest policy experiments ever based on a single economic model.
Don't forget to save
While there was a remarkable degree of consensus that the aid to investment to growth dogma "was substantially valid", as Bhagwati's 1966 text put it, there were warnings about excessive indebtedness to donors. Turkey had already developed debt servicing problems on its past aid loans, Bhagwati noted. One early aid critic, P.T. Bauer, ironically noted in 1972 that "foreign aid is necessary to enable underdeveloped countries to service the subsidized loans... under earlier foreign aid agreements." 14 The obvious way to avoid a debt problem with official donors was to increase national saving. Bhagwati said this was a job for the state: the state had to raise taxes to generate public savings. 15 Rostow predicted the recipient country will naturally increase its savings as it takes off, so that after "ten or fifteen years" the donors can anticipate aid being "discontinued."
This emphasis on saving led economists to be optimistic about countries whose mineral resources gave them a pool of savings. Kamarck (1967) predicted that Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Zaire), Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (using their modern names) were likely to reach or surpass seven percent growth. 16 [None of these countries fulfilled Karmarck's prediction. Their median growth 1967-92 was 2.8 percent.]
Hollis Chenery stressed the need for national saving even more heavily in his famous application of the Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap model. Chenery and Strout (1966) start off in the usual way with a model in which aid will "fill the temporary gap between investment ability and saving ability." 17 Investment then goes into growth with the usual ICOR formulation (assumed as a matter of convenience). But they also had a marginal saving rate (i.e. the rate of saving out of the increase in income). This marginal saving rate had to be high enough for the country to eventually move into "self-sustained" growth, in which it financed its investment needs out of its own savings. They suggested that donors relate "the amount of aid supplied to the recipient's effectiveness in increasing the rate of domestic saving." (Donors did not follow this suggestion.) "Although physical capital accumulation may be considered a necessary condition of development, it has not proved sufficient." 23 As a leading textbook (Todaro 1994) echoes, "the basic reason why {the investment-led takeoff} didn't work was not because more saving and investment isn't a necessary condition --it is --but rather because it is not a sufficient condition." 24 Or for yet another leading textbook, (Gillis et al. 1996 , p. 301) says "for countries with an ICOR of 3, a necessary, but not sufficient condition for achieving sustained aggregate growth in output of 5 percent is securing capital resources equivalent to 15 percent of GDP."
Harrod-Domar meets the computer
The "necessary but not sufficient" consensus gave Harrod-Domar a new lease on life. In the donor community in the 1980s, aid now often carried strict conditions on "getting prices right." But the use of the Harrod-Domar model for calculating the "Financing Gap" continued.
The idea was that Harrod-Domar gave you the financing requirements for the "necessary" investment, while conditions on getting prices right would give you the "sufficient" conditions for growth.
Unfortunately, enforcement of "getting prices right" turned out to be more difficult than expected (just as enforcing saving conditionality had earlier). Burnside and Dollar 1996 find no evidence that aid affected countries' policies either positively or negatively over 1970-93. 25 The designers of conditionality did not fully appreciate the Samaritan's dilemma --that a soft-hearted donor cannot credibly commit to withhold funds even if the recipient violates the conditions (Svensson 1997) . The Financing Gap calculation itself created perverse incentives, since --if the saving conditionality proved ineffective --it gave more aid to countries that saved less.
Harrod-Domar in The New Growth Literature
Harrod - ), but suggested that there was a "learning by doing" externality from physical capital to technological knowledge (K β ) so that production was given by:
If you then assumed that α+β=1, as Romer (1987) suggested it was convenient to do, then you got a linear relationship between output and capital. He found comfort for this view in crosssection regressions in which growth was significantly and linearly related to the investment rate.
( Romer (1987) makes no reference to the longstanding linear growth-investment relation in development economics.)
However, Romer soon became disenchanted with the arbitrary assumption that physical capital would automatically lead to a technological spillover (and of just the right amount to give constant returns to capital). In a recent survey article on the new growth literature, Romer (1994 p. 20) said that his "greatest regret" was "the emphasis on physical capital" in his 1987 paper. He soon turned to models of endogenous creation of new ideas and new goods --models that were very far from a linear relationship between output and physical capital. As he put it in another article, developing countries suffered not from an Object Gap --like lack of physical capital --but rather an Idea Gap --lack of technology (Romer 1993 ).
Another production function in the new growth literature that seemed in the spirit of This paper is not about the long run relationship between investment and growth (about which there is still considerable controversy in the current growth literature.) 27 In the short run, we do not know much about the how long it will take for productive investment to translate into growth, and in what amounts. Even when just one other factor--human capital --is included, the dynamics are enormously variable (Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin 1993) .
Harrod-Domar in the 90s
The Harrod Domar growth model still lives today in many international organizations.
Over 90 percent of country desk economists at the World Bank, for example, use some variant of RMSM today to make projections. 28 Economists also used the model amongst the chaotic transition from Communism to capitalism. The Bank's 1993 report on Lithuania said that "large amounts of external assistance will be required" in order to "provide the resources for critical investments" to stem the output decline. 35 
II. Testing the Financing Gap model
As far as I know, nobody has done a full-scale test of the model with cross-country data.
It's easy to understand why. By the time that large-scale cross-country datasets became available, the model had already fallen out of favor in the academic literature. Yet, as we have seen, the model lives on in the determination of aid requirements and growth prospects of poor countries. Research should test not only models that dominate the academic literature, but also models that dominate applied economics practice. Let's now test this model.
Aid to investment
When Harrod-Domar users calculated aid requirements as the excess of "required" investment over actual saving, their presumption was that aid will go one for one into investment.
Moreover, aid givers talked about conditionality that would require countries to increase their rate of national saving at the same time, which some thought would even happen naturally, as we saw above. So aid combined with conditionality should increase investment by even more than one to one. Let's see what actually happened.
We have 88 countries on which we have data spanning the period 1965-95 (Table 1) . 43 How many of these countries show a significant and positive relationship of foreign aid to investment, with a coefficient greater than or equal to one? Well before getting to these niceties, I have to point out that 60 percent of the countries show a negative relationship between foreign aid and investment (Table 1) 
Investment to growth
The second link in the Financing Gap/Harrod-Domar model is the linear growthinvestment relationship. Does the linear investment -growth relationship work well in the data?
Of course if we recalculate ICOR every period to be (Lagged Investment/GDP) over Growth, then the relationship holds tautologically. What we really want to know is if the relationship has some predictive power, i.e. if we can predict growth with a constant ICOR.
I use Summers and Heston data for GDP and Investment so that the Investment/GDP ratios are in common international prices and comparable across countries. There are 4883
annual observations in a pooled sample of data over 1950-92, with at least partial data for 146 countries. A reasonable reader will object at this point that the use of annual data is inappropriate In the entire pooled sample, the ICOR is 5.35. The R-squared is negative, which is of course possible in a regression that omits a constant term. 44 The negative R-squared says that we could predict growth better by projecting the global average growth for all countries and years. The To check how much the poor performance of the Harrod-Domar model is due to the use of annual data, I also tried a pooled regression on four-year averages. I lagged investment by one four-year period, giving me about a thousand observations. Five years is a common forecast horizon on country desks in the World Bank. Country economists usually project the first year exogenously, so 4 years is de facto a common horizon.
The results with four-year averages do not bode well for Harrod-Domar. The R2 is -.26
in the regression without a constant (the estimated ICOR is 5.6). In the regression with a constant, the R2 is 0.0008, lagged investment is statistically insignificant, and the implied ICOR is 100 (results available upon request). 45 In first differences with four-year averages, I at last get a positive R-squared in a regression without a constant; unfortunately, the relationship between the change in growth and the lagged change in investment is negative.
Let's now allow the ICOR to vary across countries by regressing growth on lagged investment to GDP individually for each country. We have 138 countries with at least 10 observations on growth and lagged investment. When we regress growth on lagged investment, we have the same problem as in the pooled model with no constant: well over half of the countries have a negative R-squared (Table 2) . We would have been better off predicting growth in each country by just presuming it was constant (at its historical average, for example).
Moreover, to make things worse, of the countries with positive R-squared, only half of them --less than a fifth of the sample --have an ICOR in the "reasonable" range between 2 and 5 (some restriction to a "reasonable range" is desirable because the estimated ICORs in this sample vary from -35 to 18). Table 3 shows the results of including a constant in these country by country regressions. Only a small fraction of the countries have a positive and significant relationship between growth and lagged investment, and an even smaller fraction are in the "usual" ICOR range between 2 and 5. I also require these countries have a constant insignificantly different from zero to fit
Harrod-Domar. The four economies that pass the Table 3 test are an unusual assortment: Israel, Liberia, Reunion (a French colony), and Tunisia. 46 Remembering the few countries where the aid-to-investment link worked as expected, I
can now say that the Financing Gap/Harrod-Domar model fits one country: Tunisia.
Unfortunately, 1 success out of 138 countries is likely to have occurred by chance even if the model made no empirical sense --which so far the evidence says it doesn't.
Is investment necessary in the short-run?
For the other 137 countries, the ritual incantation of practitioners at this point is that "investment is necessary but not sufficient." Table 4 shows how often the necessary investment rates (lagged one period) accompany one-year high growth episodes over 1950-92 (defining high growth as 7 percent or above, a desideratum often mentioned, as we have seen). 47 At the optimistic ICOR of 2 we have less than half of the sample complying with the necessary conditions. At the "normal" ICOR of 3.5, nine-tenths or more of the sample violate the "necessary" condition. At an ICOR of 5, the "necessary" investment accompanied just 1 percent of the high growth episodes. (Recall that the regressions estimated ICOR to be above 5 in both the annual and four-year-average datasets).
The second column of Table 4 shows how many four-year-long growth episodes were accompanied by the necessary investment rates (lagged one period). There were no four-year high growth episodes that had the "required" investment implied by an ICOR of 5; even at the highly optimistic ICOR of 2 just half of the episodes had the "required" investment. At the shortrun horizons at which development analysts work, there is no evidence that investment is a necessary condition for high growth. Table 4 : How "necessary" is investment in the short run?
High growth episodes (7 percent or above) that have "required" investment/GDP (%):
Period lengths Assuming ICOR of:
Annual averages Four-year averages 5 1 % 0 % 3.5 9% 11% 2 37% 49% Note: investment is lagged one period, for both 1-year and 4-year averages.
Using the 1-year and 4-year averages for both growth and investment, let's also look at episodes where growth increased and see how often investment increased by the "required amount." Table 5 gives us the answer: during episodes of increased growth with four-year periods, investment increased by the "required amount" between 6 and 12 percent of the time, depending on the ICOR. The other 88 to 94 percent of the episodes violated the "necessary condition". Of course, the data are even more unkind to the "necessary condition" with annual averages. Empirically speaking, increases in investment are neither necessary nor sufficient for increases in growth over the medium run. 
Jointly evaluating the aid-to-investment and investment-to-growth links
We The Harrod Domar/Financing Gap model predicted that the constant would be zero, the coefficients on initial investment and Aid would be equal and positive, and the coefficient on population growth would be -1. All of these predictions are rejected. The constant is significantly above zero. 49 The coefficient on Aid/GNP is significantly negative. 50 The coefficient on population growth is significantly different from -1 (people do contribute to GDP apparently). Here the only free parameter being estimated is the (equal) coefficient on Initial Investment/GDP and Aid/GDP, which comes out to imply an ICOR a little over 5. I impose the constant to be zero and the coefficient on population growth to be -1. These constraints do so much violence to the data as would earn them a life sentence in most states. The R2 turns sharply negative, as can happen with constrained least squares. I perform an F-test of the null hypothesis that all three constraints (zero constant, equal coefficients on investment and aid, and -1 on population growth) hold. I reject the null hypothesis rather emphatically: the P-value for the test statistic is 7.3E-18 (about 1 in 100 quadrillion).
III. Conclusions
The Harrod Domar growth model lies behind Financing Gap calculations that influence economic policy and the allocation of aid resources. Yet, the Harrod Domar growth model makes no sense theoretically and it fails empirically.
It is not hard to think of better rules for determining aid amounts per country than Filling the Financing Gap. Donors could allocate aid per capita to poor countries according to which countries have the best track records on economic policies. Likewise, it's not hard to think of better ways of projecting growth than to use a model that makes no sense theoretically and fails empirically. Country economists could project growth subjectively using world average growth, the country's historical average growth, country policies, and external conditions. International organizations spending money on running Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap models could perhaps put those resources to better use elsewhere.
Even for countries that do not receive aid, like most in Latin America, the HarrodDomar/Financing Gap model is not a reliable guide to policy. For example, as we have seen, ICOR calculations often lead to urgent calls for increasing saving. This in turn leads to calls for the government to increase saving, much like in the 1960s (cf. Bhagwati 1966 above) . Since a decline in private saving offsets 40 to 60 percent of any increase in public saving (Serven and Schmidt Hebbel (1997) , p. 92), one also has to make the far from obvious case that government can use these savings better than private firms and households. This paper also raises the question of how such a wide gap developed between the academic growth literature and the applied economists trying to get real economies to grow. I suspect that once such a wide gap opens, incentives are weak on both sides to close it.
In sum, there is no theoretical or empirical justification for assuming a short-run proportional relationship between investment and growth. There is no theoretical or empirical justification for calculating a "financing gap" between "investment requirements" and saving.
There is no theoretical or empirical justification for using such a "financing gap" calculation to influence policy or the allocation of foreign aid. After forty years, the Ghost of Financing Gap can finally be laid to rest.
